
# Delegation with (nearly) optimal time/space overhead

Justin Holmgren MIT Ron Rothblum MIT















"
$$M(x) = y$$
", proof







"
$$M(x) = y$$
", proof



accept?





"
$$M(x) = y$$
", proof



accept?

Complexity << evaluating M(x)



M(x)=?, challenge

"M(x) = y", proof




accept?

Complexity << evaluating M(x)


# Verifiable Computation In Practice


Figure 5. Prover overhead normalized to native execution cost for two computations. Prover overheads are generally enormous.



# Verifiable Computation In Practice

"An additional bottleneck is memory: the prover must materialize a transcript of a computation's execution."





#### **Our focus:**

- Prover efficiency
- Computational assumptions

	Model	Assumptions	<b>Prover Time</b>	Prover Space
No-Signaling PCP [KRR14, KP15, B <b>H</b> K16]	RAM	PIR	poly(T)	poly(T)

	Model	Assumptions	<b>Prover Time</b>	Prover Space
No-Signaling PCP [KRR14, KP15, B <b>H</b> K16]	RAM	PIR	$T^{60}$ ?	$T^{60}$ ?

	Model	Assumptions	<b>Prover Time</b>	Prover Space
No-Signaling PCP [KRR14, KP15, B <b>H</b> K16]	RAM	PIR	$T^3$ ?	$T^3$ ?

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No-Signaling PCP [KRR14, KP15, B <b>H</b> K16]	RAM	PIR	$T^3$ ?	$T^3$ ?
SNARKs [BC12, BCCT12,]	RAM	Non-Falsifiable	$T\cdot poly(\kappa)$	$S \cdot poly(\kappa)$
Succinct Garbling [GHRW14, KLW15, CH15, CCCLLZ15]	RAM	Obfuscation	$T\cdot poly(\kappa)$	$S\cdot poly(\kappa)$

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
Extends to (cache-efficient) RAM

# Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

#### Probabilistically Checkable Proofs


Proof string  $\pi$ 






Verifier

# Probabilistically Checkable Proofs




# Probabilistically Checkable Proofs




#### Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

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
 $x \in \mathcal{L} \implies$  exists convincing proof

every proof convinces  $x \notin \mathcal{L} \implies$ with low probability



Verifier

# Probabilistically Checkable Proofs




Not a standard-model delegation scheme














PCP-based Delegation [Biehl-Meyer-Wetzel 98]







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 [Dwork-Langberg-Naor-Nissim-Reingold 01]



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- Sound if the PCP is *no-signaling* sound [Kalai-Raz-Rothblum 14]




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


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
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


#### Observation 0



• If PIR = FHE, just need efficient "random-access" to PCP.

## Observation 0




## WANTED

No-Signaling PCP with efficient prover

If PIR = FI
 access" to

\$\$\$ reward



dom-

**1** Simpler and direct NS-PCP(essentially BFLS) for any language  $\mathcal{L} \in \mathsf{TISP}(T,S)$ 

Remove major component of KRR, namely "augmented circuit"

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2 Super-efficient prover: Any

time:  $\tilde{O}(T)$ 

space: S

BFLS already known to be complexity-preserving?
[BC12, BTVW14]

in

2' Limited efficiency loss under FHE time:  $T \cdot \operatorname{poly}(\lambda)$  space:  $S + \operatorname{poly}(\lambda)$ 

- 1 Simpler and direct NS-PCP(essentially BFLS) for any language  $\mathcal{L} \in \mathsf{TISP}(T,S)$  for deterministic computations
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with **non-deterministic** 

2' Limited efficiency loss under FIL time:  $T \cdot \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$  space:  $S + \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ 

NOT proving NS-soundness of BFLS for deterministic circuits


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
**Part 1:** Turing / RAM Machines → (non-succinct) deterministic circuits


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
**Part 2:** (part of) BFLS prover efficiency despite non-succinctness.









:





TM Configuration


Transcript / Circuit




Configuration:

OOOO


#### Configuration:




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


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


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
(diameter log S)



Important for BFLS: Graph is "regular"!




Graph is "regular"!



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no routing networks!

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


Important for BFLS: Graph is "regular"!

no Merkle trees!

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
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
Let  $f:\{0,1\}^m \to \mathbb{F}$  be any function.

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0	0
0	1

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





multilinear

$$\hat{f}: \mathbb{F}^m \to \mathbb{F}$$

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
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
$$\hat{f}: \mathbb{F}^m \to \mathbb{F}$$

$$\hat{f}(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^m} f(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \hat{\mathbf{1}}_{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{x})$$

# The PCP (BFLS) Part 1: Multilinear extension

Let  $f:\{0,1\}^m\to\mathbb{F}$  be any function.






multilinear


$$\hat{f}: \mathbb{F}^m \to \mathbb{F}$$

"funny x" 
$$\in \mathbb{F}^m$$
 
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 "bold x"  $\in \{0,1\}^m$ 

$$\hat{\mathcal{C}}(y, x) = \sum_{\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}} \mathcal{C}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}) \cdot \hat{\mathbf{1}}_{\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}}(y, x)$$

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**1.** Evaluating extension of transcript  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}: \{0,1\}^{t+s} \to \{0,1\}$ 

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


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
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Config<sub>1</sub>

Config o

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Config<sub>1</sub>

Config o


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





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
Coefficients structured; all is still well



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
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# Summary

		Assumptions	Prover Time	Prover Space
•	No-Signaling PCPs [KRR,]	PIR	$\geq T^3S^3$	$\geq T^3S^3$
	SNARKs [BC,BCCT,]	Non-Falsifiable	$T \cdot poly(\kappa)$	$S \cdot poly(\kappa)$
	Succinct Garbling [GHRW, KLW,]	Obfuscation/ multilinear maps	$T \cdot poly(\kappa)$	$S \cdot poly(\kappa)$
1	[this work]	"Slightly" Homomorphic Encryption	$T \cdot poly(\kappa)$	$S+poly(\kappa)$

### Open Questions

- How does this compare in practice? What are the remaining bottlenecks?
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degree (GSW) even

better